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The   definition   used   in   the   document,   while   comprehensive,   applies   only   to   trusted   systems   using   a 
nondiscretionary security policy. It defines a covert  channel as: “Given a nondiscretionary (e.g., mandatory) 
security  policy  model  M and   its   interpretation   I(M)   in   an  operating   system,   any  potential   communication 
between   two   subjects   I(Sh)   and   I(Si)   of   I(M)   is   covert   if   and   only   if   any   communication   between   the 
corresponding subjects Sh and  Si of the model M is illegal in M.” (Tsai et al. cited in NCSC, 1993, p.9).























































DNS   zone.   This  means   that   the   server   is   responsible   for   answering   all  DNS   requests   for,   e.g.   the   zone 
“example.com”. From a machine internal to the protected network, which does not have public internet access, 
the adversary then launches DNS requests for a random hostname, containing the information to be tunnelled 




into   the   protected   network.  By  using   encryption   and   encoding   techniques   on   this   data,   large   amounts   of 
information can easily be tunnelled in and out, or connections could be established successfully. 
As these are all legitimate connections according to the DNS protocol, there is very little detection that can 












HTTP Entity Tag Tunneling


































































Covert encoding or steganography
Each of the above techniques specifically provides a way to piggyback information onto an existing protocol. An 

















processing   fore  quite   some   time,   as   software  which   purports   to  perform a   certain   function  while   actually 
completing a less desired act upon execution. In general, an end user was still required to manually ‘open’ the 
horse, by clicking on, for example, an e­mail attachment. Certain Trojan horses can now however be considered 



































Many   of   the   above   items   posed   significant   issues   during   the   initial   vulnerability   outbreak.  While  most 
organizations  have  now put  measures   in  place   to   remedy   these   and  anti   virus  vendors  have   released  new 
signatures that are able to counter these threats – there were obviously some structural issues here. One of them 
was a lack of imagination: how could images be executable?











systems,   it  applies   less  to  the  types of  systems predominantly  used by commercial  organizations.  The only 
commonly used commercial operating system assessed under the TCSEC, Windows NT, was accredited only to 
the C2 level, which excludes covert channel analysis.























to   review   the   information   handling   infrastructure   holistically   and   integrate   in   existing   risk   management 
methodology.   In  addition,  each  threat  presented above poses unique bandwidth  requirements.  One catch­all 
metric to assess their importance is no longer sufficient.
RISK MANAGEMENT APPROACHES TO DECEPTION
Covert   channels   perhaps  best   compare   to   the  physical   act   of   smuggling.  Risk  management   approaches   to 
smuggling are often based on probabilistic risk management, the measurement of the probability of an incident 
taking place based on intelligence gathered on the risk level, our current system state and our adversaries. This 
























Continuous   risk  analysis  efforts   such as  vulnerability  assessments  concentrate  on  vulnerabilities   in  specific 
software components. While they may also perform some limited testing of firewalling or intrusion prevention 
capabilities, they do not focus specifically on generic covert channel capabilities.
Acceptance   tests   such   as   penetration   testing   could   be   useful   in   the   identification   of   covert   channels. 
Unfortunately, they are usually interested in finding ‘one way of many’ to compromise a system. They do not 
specialize in identifying each of the potential vulnerabilities. The types of threats posed by covert channels are so 
drastically  different   from  immediate  compromise   that   they  may be  disregarded  by any  penetration  test  not 
specifically designed for that purpose.

















could   also   lead   to   direct   circumvention   of   carefully   crafted   filtering   systems,   or   be   a   stepping   stone   to 
compromise through ‘blended threats’.





identify  the risk  of  covert  channels.   It  would be useful   to develop a framework  that allows for   the holistic 
identification of covert channels in information networks. This should be integrated in existing risk management 
methodology, and allow information security managers to obtain a more accurate view of the threat, improving 
security decision making. The tool of threat modelling is briefly touched upon and identified as a candidate for 
this purpose.
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